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Abstract. Accountability is the control side in a relationship of delegation. Its devices elicit 
information from the agents to prove that they meet key values and legitimate concerns. 
Expected to yield effective and democratic policies, it can spoil them instead — and the debate is 
still open on which facets exactly matter. The Institutional Analysis and Development framework 
suggests that convincing reasons lie in the institutional design. To it, institutions are effective as 
enforced instructions that restrain the players’ strategies in an action situation — and their power 
varies with the contents and the completeness of their syntax. Following the framework, the 
article locates the critical juncture of accountability in the administrative sphere, and the roots of 
the dilemma in the distrust that accountability designs entail when they conceive the bureaucracy 
as an agent instead than as a trustee. Finally, it applies the Institutional Grammar Tool to the 
procedures that can mark the difference between the agent’s and the trustee’s design, in the 
prospect of empirical adjudication. 
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A bulging discourse across disciplines recognizes accountability as an essential “virtue” of 
representative democracies (Bovens 2010, van Kersbergen and van Waarden 2004). On the 
normative side, the obligation to account marks the difference between democratic 
delegation and abdication (e.g. Strøm 2000, Manin et al. 1999). On the prescriptive side, 
accountability is expected to lessen corruption, arbitrariness and inefficiency in the policy-
making while promoting learning and self-correction (e.g. Bovens et al. 2008, Ackerman 2004, 
Behn 2001, Mulgan 2000, Aucoin and Heintzmann 2000, Considine 2000). On a more general 
ground, accountability is associated to higher responsiveness and better “output legitimacy” 
of the political system (van Kersbergen and van Vaarden 2004, Scharpf 1999). Evidence 
however tells that accountability cannot always keep all of its promises. Just the opposite, 
obligations to account can cause rigidities, turn means into ends, trigger deceiving games, and 
eventually divert what they were meant to steer straight (Hood 2011, Pollitt 2011, Weaver 
1986). They have been found to work, though. When they circulate timely information on 
relevant policy risks and empower citizens, they can trigger consequential changes (Ackerman 
2004, Fung et al. 2007, Fung 2013).  
Mixed results partly mirror the intrinsic ambiguity of accountability as a concept 
(Bovens et al. 2014). In the span from public management to international relations, it has 
been understood as checks and balances; as the institutionalization of public reasoning, 
justification, storytelling to legitimize the decision-making; as practices for managing and 
possibly aligning legal, political, professional, managerial, public expectations; as the 
possibility for ordinary citizens to see misconducts and wrongdoings punished. Answerability, 
responsibility, liability, transparency, openness are all contents variously associated to the 
label, although their overlapping is far from perfect and accountability may still exist without 
one or more of them (Bovens et al. 2014, Held 2004, Kooiman 2003, Considine 2002, Behn 
2001, Mulgan 2000, Schedler 1999, Fearon 1999, Manin et al. 1999, O’Donnell 1998, Romzek 
and Dubnik 1987). 
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Beyond fuzziness, however, a number of core points can be taken for granted. First, 
accountability is an institutional technology of control. Second, it is meant for getting 
information. Third, it applies to those who play as “agents” in a relationship of delegation and 
who, for such reason, have to give accounts. Fourth, it reveals how agents comply with an 
array of policy values — spanning from efficiency and sustainability to fairness, adequacy, 
effectiveness. Fifth, “account-givers” entail “account-takers”. Sixth, the relationship between 
takers and givers is defined by, respectively, rights of being accounted and matching 
obligations to account. Seventh, accountability is a mechanism that shapes the agent’s 
preferences and behavior: an agent is compelled to “internalize” some policy value as her main 
concern when she knows it as the yardstick against which she will be judged. Partly, hence, 
mixed results simply reveal that good accountability is a conditional state — depending on 
who has the obligation to account, to whom, when, how, about what, and which consequences 
the “account-giver” has to face if she cannot meet the requests of the “account-taker” 
(Marshaw 2006; Bovens and Schillemans 2011, Bovens et al. 2008, Bovens 2007, Mulgan 2003, 
Behn 2001, Romzek and Dubnik 1987).  
A variety of studies have developed from this assumption, usually casting light on the 
accountability relationship from the viewpoint of one or more of the possible w-questions. 
These studies have been often meant to debunk some myth — such as, that more 
accountability is better, that sanctions are necessary requisites, or that account-takers are 
always eager to be informed (e.g. Schillemans and Busuioc 2015, Schillemans 2010, Pollitt 
2011, Koppell 2005). They hence portray “good accountability” as a delicate equilibrium in the 
players’ strategies that can easily turn into a nightmare because of distrust (Hood 2011). Their 
findings put a further question forward, asking what induces account-givers and account–takers 
to play “good accountability”, and what lead them astray instead. 
The question makes special sense in the light of the Institutional Analysis and 
Development framework (henceforth, IAD: Ostrom 1986, 2005; Ostrom et al. 1994), and of 
its Institutional Grammar Tool (hereafter, IGT: Crawford and Ostrom 1995, Ostrom 2005). The 
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framework is known for suiting the analysis of “social dilemmas”, of which accountability 
provides a further example. The IAD offers causal stories that make sense of dilemmas, and 
usable suggestions for fixing them. It considers that people’s strategies are molded by 
institutions-as-rules — sets of “constraints (spoken, written, or tacitly understood 
prescriptions or advice) that influence mutually understood actor preferences and optimizing 
behavior” within given “action situations” (Crawford and Ostrom 1995: 582, Ostrom 2005). 
Hence, it is the rules in use that spoil the match of the account-giver’s and of the account-
taker’s strategies. Moreover, the framework comes with a sharp toolkit for analysis. The IGT 
understands rules as instructions that specify every aspect of a situation according to a 
general syntax. In a comparative design, its five key elements or “holders” — namely: 
attributes, deontic, aim, conditions, or else — expose meaningful differences in instructions 
which can justify differences in policy effectiveness across contexts.  
This article elaborates on the hint that the IAD contributes to the understanding of 
accountability as much as the IGT complements the w-questions in analysis. Section 1 reviews 
the literature to justify the analytic focus on administration. It recognizes the kernel of 
democratic accountability in credible information at voters’ disposal on how policies meet an 
array of values and concerns — and reminds how such information is generated in the 
administrative dimension. Section 2 discusses how trust can turn accountability into a tragedy. 
A sketch of the game between bureaucratic agents and elected principals tells that 
accountability triggers distrust when is designed for securing the agent’s goodwill through 
information on past performance and sanction. Yet, trust can be built on intentions, too, and 
the tragedy avoided if the principal delegates accountability rights to separate “champions”, 
each in charge of checking whether the agent’s decisions meet a special policy value before 
enacting them. Section 3 considers that these different designs are embodied in five basic 
procedural provisions — administrative judicial review, impact assessment, audit, freedom of 
information, notice-and-comment rulemaking — that set the rights of courts, experts, and the 
general public to assess administrative decisions against the policy value of their concern. The 
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IGT is then applied to each so as to expose the possible variation in contents that future 
evidence can prove crucial to policy effectiveness. Some concluding considerations are left to 
Section 4. 
 
1. Whose accountability makes a more convincing causal story? 
Different literatures have probed the relationship of accountability and policy performance 
on different junctures of a delegation chain. Although each juncture imparts a special twist 
on policies, the one of elected politicians to bureaucracies promises to prove more crucial 
than others to policy effectiveness — so that if key players in it are properly held accountable, 
then the whole system improves. Let us see why. 
.1. Governments to voters 
Bureaucracies are not the usual suspect in accountability literature. A robust stream 
instead maintains that the government matters most. The government is the agent of the 
political majority, selected so as to make their policy preferences true. Typical theories 
consider democracy secured when the citizens are given the means to hold their 
representatives responsible for the policies that they deliver — in a nutshell, if they can “throw 
the rascals out” of office with their vote (Strokes 2005, Miller and Wattenberg 1985). From 
such a perspective, competitive elections are the key device, as they compel the government 
to deliver consistently with the electoral mandate. 
A whole host of empirical studies has tested the hypothesis, usually to validate the 
mechanism (e.g. Ashworth 2012). The common driving question asks if voters consider past 
policy performance when deciding whether to cast a ballot in favor of the incumbent. Findings 
tell that “economic voting” does have an effect on reelection, and that its effect is neater 
when political responsibilities are clearer and the chain of delegation straight — which is 
seldom the case, as departures occur under minority, divided, or coalition governments; when 
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competences are distributed across multiple overlapping jurisdictions; or whenever the chain 
of command to policy delivery displays a disjunction. Even under the most linear chain, 
moreover, politicians can still deliver short-term benefits with long-run adverse effects 
instead than effective policies (e.g. Fisher and Hobolt 2010). Incumbents find reasons for 
“pandering” voters whenever the latter “may not have learned whether the previously chosen 
policy was truly in their interests”, due to the lack of credible policy information at the time of 
election (Canes-Wrone et al. 2001: 533). Counterfactually, the incentive to pandering 
disappears when the electorate can learn that the incumbent’s policies meet their “true 
interest” (Manin et al. 1999:40). 
Electoral accountability hence explains policy effectiveness under conditions that the 
government can actually secure responsive policies, and credible information about them. 
Yet, both credible information and policy responsiveness are generated beyond the 
government’s direct command.  
.2. Delivery systems to affected interests 
The mismatch between what the government is held responsible for and what it 
actually can control shifts attention to the last junctions of the policymaking. The alternative 
discourse on accountability reasons that policy performance is ultimately shaped in the 
delivery system — where some established quality and quantity of a special good is actually 
made available to citizens at particular conditions (e.g. Ingram and Schneider 2006). In 
Ostrom’s terms, the delivery is the significant “action situation”, and its effectiveness is 
shaped by the rules of coordination in use. Indeed, scholars have found that producers can 
follow three distinct rationales of coordination — hierarchical, market and network — each 
capable of securing key policy values as well as the production of related policy information 
(e.g. Goodin 2003).  
Conversely, each rationale has since long been diagnosed with systematic policy and 
information failure, too (Schrank and Whitford 2011, Wolf 1979). For-profit producers in 
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competitive markets are theoretically compelled to responsiveness and cannot hide the 
special performance information conveyed by prices: yet, they select their customers, and fail 
to produce those goods that cannot be effectively priced despite often being of public 
interest; moreover, predatory practices can spoil the advantages of fair competition. 
Cooperative networks develop around the commitment of non-profit producers toward 
specific policy goods of public interest, and toward the demands of special deserving 
beneficiaries — although they can prove opaque as for behavior, cost, and service 
information. Public producers in hierarchical arrangements behave according to standards, 
which make them fit to universal even delivery — yet nor to reveal the true production costs 
neither to secure that the goods will serve the beneficiaries as intended.  
Success and failures are therefore ingrained in each rationale — and this may be 
enough for discharging the government from some policy responsibility. Yet, the IAD 
suggests these failures are far from inevitable. They rather depend on the rules, incentives 
and sanctions in force in the context — and, as such, can be changed for better. Such a belief 
is at the root of electoral accountability, too: customers, beneficiaries, taxpayers, the same 
producers who experience policy failures of some kind as unbearable — they all can become 
part of the electoral majority, endow politicians with the capacity to intervene on them, and 
punish them for inaction or poor solutions. Mandated politicians can put delivery problems in 
the government’s agenda, and establish policy solutions — as taxes, fees, grants, exemptions, 
standards, contractual conditions, right auctions, vouchers, or whatever inducement or 
restraint changes the behavior of the actors in the delivery system for better (Hood and 
Margretts 2007, Salamon 2002). What politicians rather lack is the knowledge for designing 
and running any of these solutions. Such a knowledge usually lies in the bureaucracy instead. 
.3. Bureaucracies to elected officials 
Since Weber, the “political master” only is a “dilettante” before the expertise of 
appointed officials with long experience of administration. The “tool-shapers” know how to 
design policy instruments; have preferences about when and how doing it; and, moreover, are 
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the ones actually keeping them up. If we maintain with Ostrom that failures occur because 
the restraints to the players in the field are ill-designed, then the tool-shapers are the ones 
who should be held accountable for it — and the ones whose accountability may prove harder, 
too. 
The problem is especially visible in the evolution of ministerial responsibility in the 
British case — the architype of the linear system. There, consequential decisions are taken by 
civil servants in ministry departments: and while ministers hardly be personally responsible 
for the details of administrative decisions, they still are expected to answer for them in 
parliament and the media, giving reasons for contents and, if necessary, impose remedies 
(Mulgan 2014). As Goodin notes: “while this is a good model of ‘responsible government’, in 
the sense of always giving us someone to blame, it is hardly a model of ‘accountable’ 
government, in the sense of giving us someone from whom a first-hand account can sensibly 
be demanded” (2003:370). The institution of agencies with mandate to govern special sectors, 
and subject to scrutiny from ombudsmen, parliamentary committees, auditors, and the 
publics thanks to freedom of information legislation, can count as an attempt to define the 
responsibilities of the solution-shapers while shielding the political principal from policy 
failures. Yet, agencification and increased scrutiny rather raised the general suspect of a 
deficit of accountability in administration, and induced ministers and agency heads to “buck-
passing” games (Hood 2011).  
The solution-shapers appear as the key actors in the policymaking for which 
accountability is highly consequential yet the balance between liability and credible 
information is harder (Gains and Stoker 2009). As such, this special juncture provides the 
ground where accountability devices can make the highest difference to policy effectiveness. 
The next step is to understand how these devices can make such a difference. 
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2. How can accountability be policy-effective? 
Accountability devices have been usually understood as the answer to an “agency problem”. 
The problem arises whenever “an agent is delegated, implicitly or explicitly, the authority to 
take action on behalf of another, that is, the principal” (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991:239) but 
the principal has little information about motivation, action or performance of the agent and 
hence is concerned that she can drift from his intentions and so inflict him “agency losses”. 
When applied to the junction of politics and administration, common readings identify the 
agency problem in the tendency of the agent to develop her own policy preferences that fall 
short of the principal’s ambitions (e.g. Niskanen 1971). Control, and its feedback side of 
accountability, thus first are strategies to make “elephants gallop” (Rainey and Steinbauer 
1999). 
.1. Performance and procedure 
To align the bureaucratic agent’s preferences with his own, the political principal can 
set incentives and, more important, give her performance targets. As management wisdom 
maintains, performance measurement entails a powerful leverage for keeping the agent’s 
behavior oriented to effectiveness: “what gets measured gets done, what gets measured and 
fed back gets done well, what gets rewarded gets repeated” (e.g. Halachmi 2014). Common 
understandings of accountability add the further clause that what gets punished gets 
sidelined. 
Exactly because of its power, performance measurement can fail in multiple ways. 
Performance can become disappointing if the obligation falls on top of further and 
contradicting requirements (e.g. Schillemans and Bovens 2011). But they also can prove 
deceptive when based on the wrong measure of the right thing, or on the wrong thing tout 
court — a likely case when indicators narrow on short term gains alone (e.g. Behn 2001, 2003). 
When performance is gauged as outcomes outside the control of the implementers, it may 
simply reward the “lucky ones” (e.g. Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001). When instead 
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performance is measured as some output under the full control of the agent, it may foster 
some unbalanced delivery of none’s interest. A tight political command of performance may 
also rise expectations of laxer policies that undermine the credibility of the intervention (e.g. 
Kydland and Prescott 1977). Sanctions narrows the agent’s attention down on some indicator 
— which may lead to the obstinate pursuit of actions despite looming failure in the hope of a 
change of fortune; or to “playing with numbers” and waste resources in the effort of “looking 
good” (e.g. Dubnik 2005; Pollitt 2003, 2011; Mulgan 2003). 
The alternative solution to the agency problem rests on steering through best 
practices and processes instead (Pollitt 2011, Dubnick 2005, Behn 2001, Shapiro 1994). Under 
this strategy, the principal defines procedures to which the agent’s behavior shall conform, in 
the belief that correctness will lead to the expected result or prevent undesired policy 
problems. Steering through procedures compels the principal to deal with “how-to” questions 
beneath performance generation, and wards off disproportionate expectations. Moreover, 
procedures can yield fine-grained and usable information about reasons for failure that can 
be used for improvement. As procedures change at a slower pace than the environment which 
they should fit in, they guarantee credibility — yet, at the cost of flexibility and effectiveness. 
Procedures shift the agent’s attention away from performance, and narrow it down to correct 
behavior. When the two diverge, accountability criteria discourage the agent from addressing 
the mismatch and reinforces the tendency to ritualism intrinsic to organizations (e.g. Tetlock 
and Mellers 2011). Moreover, procedural accountability can be easily fooled by tactics of 
“cosmetic compliance” (Krawiec 2003), which leaves the principals with neither useful 
information on behavior nor performance. Even worse, procedural accountability requires a 
thorough system of oversight, the costs of which may far exceed the advantages of full 
compliance. In addition, oversight may return mixed rewards to the principal. It can reveal 
problems that open the opportunity for new law-making and rule-making, thus for signaling 
his activism to voters (Bawn 1997); at the same time, oversight can backfire as problems come 
with blame — unless a suitable scapegoat is found to be feeding to the public (Hood 2011, 
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Weaver 1986). The political principal himself may thus prefer to underinvest in oversight, and 
use selective forbearance for pandering some constituency instead (Holland 2016). 
Even this cursory review highlights a twofold point. First, both performance and 
procedure have merits as steering strategies that the principal can deploy: the former better 
serves innovation, while the latter is more suited to stabilize expectations about processes. 
So, hardly any accountability system could go without one of them. Second and related, both 
performance and procedure can get out of hands and cause ineffectiveness. To many 
observers (e.g. Behn 2001, Pollitt 2011, Hood 2011), the twist is fueled by distrust — that 
standard principal-agent models postulates as intrinsic to the relationship, and that unfolds 
into a tragedy.  
.2. Principal-agent relationships as a tragedy of distrust 
Indeed, in these models, the default assumption is of diverging preferences — so that 
the principal can neither expect that the agent’s behavior will benefit him, nor that she will at 
least avoid to harm him (Gambetta 1988). Trust can however be cultivated under proper 
conditions: when sanctions apply to deter harmful moves; when information about past 
behavior circulates, so that expectations can be aligned; when intentions are revealed 
(Shapiro et al. 1998). Standard accountability is the technology that should warrant the 
agent’s goodwill through a mix of ex-post information and sanctions. Paradoxically, however, 
such a mix pushes the players into mutual distrust even when at the beginning each considers 
the other trustworthy — as in cell i of Figure 1 below.  
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Figure 1. Accountability as the trigger of a principal-agent distrust tragedy 
 
 
Under mutual trust, the collective welfare is highest yet individual payoffs are not. The 
agent reveals the details of failures to the principal who can learn and initiate a new law-
making — and both share the blame, although the electorate will punish the principal who 
can therefore be tempted to capture the whole gains from accountability and shift the 
responsibility for failure on the agent alone (cell ii, Figure 1). By chastising the scapegoat, 
moreover, the principal may signal his activism to key constituencies without engaging into 
new and uncertain law-making rounds — which leaves the him far better-off. This, however, 
makes the agent worse-off, as she has disclosed her information, got punished for it, and no 
improvement of her situation will follow. In anticipation of blaming, the agent may thus 
choose to conceal information about design failures and problems so as to “look good” even 
to a seemingly trusting principals (cell iii). The smokescreen of good reports also allows her to 
go away with her practices, no matter how actually ineffective. Even though some producers 
or policy-takers signal some problem, formally good reports shield the agent from blame — 
leaving the principal worse off. Her payoffs are thus the highest — unless the principal, too, 
choose to distrust the agent (cell iv). This is when the principal’s attempts at getting the 
widest information and the best compliance escalate, and the agent overinvests her resources 
so as to circumvent and muddle through micromanagement, red tapes, and performance 
reports. Control definitely becomes the main concern of the two players, absorbing a 
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remarkable amount of resources at the cost of policy effectiveness — while distrust spreads 
around and lowers the legitimacy of both (Hood 2011, Pollitt 2011).  
Principal-agent theory predicts a dismal scenario mainly due to its assumptions about 
the players and about the suitable devices for securing goodwill. The principal’s stake always 
is the full control over the behavior of the agent who, on her part, has the full control on policy 
information. Accountability is an ex-post activity for imposing sanctions when procedural or 
performance standards are not met, yet which is vulnerable to the agent’s tampering. These 
assumptions are not the only possible ones, however. 
.3. Institutional designs for trust(ees) 
Delegation scholars (e.g. Gailmard and Patty 2013; Majone 2009, 2001; Huber and 
Shipan 2002; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; North and Weingast 1989) provide a fairly different 
model of the players in the politics-administration juncture.  
They consider the principal to have policy intentions, priorities, and broad ideas about 
the distribution of costs and benefits that should follow from policy upkeep or change — but 
neither the expertise to shape the proper tools for intervention, nor reliable information 
about the actual dynamics in the delivery system. The agent has the expertise on policy 
instruments that the principal needs — although she lacks crucial information from the field, 
too. Policy information is instead in the hands of the ultimate policy-takers — producers, 
consumers, and affected interests within the delivery system — who also have legitimately 
intense preferences on which tools have to be changed and in which direction. The latter not 
only vote, but also press their claims direct to the principal, who may be incapable of resisting 
for reasons of consensus. When the principal passes the details of some instrument straight 
on the agent for implementation to meet pressures, he may be making room to policy capture 
rather than to effectiveness — and get later punished for poor results. Moreover, a principal 
permeable to pressures attracts the attention of competing interests, and continuous 
adaptations to opposite demands can make a policy solution to lose its credibility. 
14 
Delegation theory hence acknowledges that the principal has the legitimacy and the 
power for policy initiation, but that policy performance is in the hands of the agent. Expertise 
and disconnection from consensus make her better equipped to resist fleeting pressures 
while adapting policies to changing problems — which confers credibility and flexibility to her 
decisions (Gailmard and Perry 2013, Dessein 2002). A kind of control that fatally constricts her 
discretion — such as outright compliance with political micromanagement — would therefore 
not be in the principal’s interest even if it were in his reach. Delegation of rulemaking 
responsibilities to the agent, moreover, shields the principal from the blame for policy 
failures, and increases his payoffs for cooperation. Delegation does not entail the necessity 
of abdication, however. The principal can rather rely on a subtler and more complex design 
that restrains the policy options available to his agent — better, his “trustee” — through 
administrative procedures (Majone 2001, McCubbins et al. 1987, 1989, 1999; Lupia and 
McCubbins 1994, Ingram and Schneider 1990). Statutory provisions can disintermediate and 
regulate the relationship between the agent and concerned publics by giving the latter — or 
special guardians of their interests — an institutional position as account-takers within the 
administrative process. 
In so doing, statutory provisions fetch a fourfold gain to the principal. First, they let 
him save on the costs of direct oversight, because enfranchised publics will check the agent 
on his behalf — and more carefully because, in so doing, they guard their own core concern. 
Second, provisions keep the trustee sensitive to the preferences of the key constituencies to 
whom the principal wants to keep the policies responsive. Third, these provisions elicit 
information crucial to the viability of policy change, as enfranchised publics have to disclose it 
to the agent when they exercise their right to foster their special points into the 
administrative process. Fourth and related, they allow the principal to rake in the credibility 
of the results — of which he can make use as incumbent in next elections.  
The advantages are not limited to the principals however. The enfranchised publics 
got a share of “political property rights” (Moe 1990) on public intervention as account-takers. 
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Although this position cannot secure their most preferred policy, it opens the opportunity for 
each to get credible policy information, and to mobilize for preventing their worst-case 
scenario. Finally, the trustee also gains from delegation design. Statutory provisions obligate 
her to make decisions that fit principles of administrative action; criteria of financial 
sustainability; standards of professional appropriateness; justifiability of distributive effects 
as enforced by courts, experts, public and private interest groups representing an array of 
actual and latent constituencies — from taxpayers to producers, users, future generations 
(Scott 2000, O’Donnell 1998). As these many “accountability vectors” also entail a special 
legitimacy each (Majone 2009), decisions that engage with these many assessments 
productively can also be more sensitive to side-effects, and prove more “right”. 
Although this has been presented as an “auto-pilot” design, allowing post-legislative 
processes without the political principals (McCubbins et al. 1987, 1989), delegation does not 
necessarily end in bureaucratic dominance. The political principal sets the game, maintains his 
position, and can repeal political property rights. The process hence unfolds “in the shadow 
of hierarchy” (Schillemans 2008) — although the restoration of the principals’ command 
would imply the reversal to the principal-agent model, and its tragedy.  
.4. The driving hypothesis 
Multiple accountability vectors in the shadow of hierarchy may not be enough to 
secure the advantages of cell i in the trust game. Just the opposite, such a “redundant 
accountability regime” (Schillemans 2010) may still drive the agent into a “multiple 
accountabilities disorder” (Koppell 2005). The key point again lies on the mode by which the 
agent is required to give account (Dubnik 2005; Behn 2001). 
Mere reporting — such as in common financial accounting — follows strict forms 
designed by the holder and hence necessitates conformity alone, frustrating the agent’s 
problem-solving capacities. It surrogates monitoring, and entails the subordination of the 
account-giver to the account-taker who so becomes a “quasi-principal”. Just the opposite, 
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account-giving as active reason-giving recognizes the agent as a trustee that provides the 
taker with the sense of her decisions. Here “account” is used as a linguistic device that provides 
the agent with the possibility of changing the understanding of some behavior or some 
performance so as to reverse the evaluation to the point of mystification. As a consequence, 
through reason-giving she can either build a fruitful dialogue that aligns her expectations with 
those of the holder, or use the discursive leverage to invert the direction of control (Dubnik 
2005, Aucoin and Heintzman 2000). When applied ex-post, reason-giving may therefore still 
count as a circumventing strategy — as in cell (iii) of the principal-agent game.  
What can avoid this shift, and lock the players in the more desirable cell (i) instead, is 
the timing of reason-giving. Recall that trust can be constructed and maintained by appealing 
to a third strategy — that is, by letting the agent’s intentions known. The agent can be made 
trustworthy by accountability devices that obligate to disclose intentions to the holders. 
Empirically, this applies when the agent has to disclose the rationale and contents of her 
drafts — and that she also has to seriously consider the reactions from unhappy holders to it, 
to the point of changing her proposal before putting her decision into action. So, disclosure 
warrants that trustee will not harm the holders’ core interests. 
These arguments suggest a set of institutional conditions none of which can alone 
secure effective accountability, yet that can be expected to obtain when jointly present in a 
context (Ostrom 2005). Together, they define the hypothesis as in the following logical 
statement:  
 
[Hp1] If the administrative decision-maker is obliged to justify her intentions to separate account-
holders, each fostering a special concern and whose judgements cannot be circumvented, 
then administrative decisions follow that contribute to high policy effectiveness. 
 
The counterfactual entails that a policy-effective accountability design is spoiled when 
the trustee has no formal obligations to account because of informal connections to the 
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political principals; or is only required to account passively as through reporting; or 
accountability is gauged as compliance to some prescribed behavior alone; or accountability 
is only due ex-post, or to a single dominant account-holder; or the trustee can easily disregard 
the account-takers’ concerns. The hypothesis therefore requires that these different 
conditions and their counterfactuals are identified in each context and operationalized so as 
to prove their contribution to good policy performance. 
 
3. Operationalizing accountability vectors through IAD and IGT 
The IAD understands account-giving again as a special “action situation” — i.e., a role-playing 
game in which participants assume positions endowed with a given capacity to act in the 
pursuit of special goals, and payoffs are attached to each combination of possible alternative 
actions. Any element of the situation — from the players’ access to a position, to the payoffs 
they get — is defined by the rules in use, which therefore shape the players’ strategies and so 
are responsible of the outcomes. The IGT specifies that rules have the generative capacity of 
the instructions that they convey into a situation. Beyond the suitability of their contents to 
the actual distribution of resources among the players, their effectiveness rests on their 
syntax (Ostrom et al. 1994, Crawford and Ostrom 1995).  
As “enforced prescriptions”, rules are statements establishing that participants, 
assigned to a position in virtue of their special characteristics [attributes, A], are obliged, 
permitted or forbidden [deontic, D] an action or outcome [aim, I] under given circumstances 
[conditions, C] — otherwise will face consequences [or else, O]. Applied to Hp1, this syntax 
allows to identify key functions and contents that can mark the empirical difference between 
a design “for trust” consistent with delegation theory, and a regime “doomed to distrust” as 
by the principal-agent theory. Moreover, it adds a further element for consideration. 
According to IGT, only when all the elements of the ADICO formula are properly specified the 
provision can unfold its constraining effects on people’s behavior and obtain as expected. 
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Misspecification at best imply that “default conditions” hold instead (Ostrom 2005) — which 
may distort the prescription.  
Thus, when Attributes are missing, the capacities related to a position may remain 
implicit, and no clear criterion applies for assigning the position so that anyone can hold it. A 
misspecified aIm leads to the player’s complete freedom of choice among the actions or goals 
that she can pursuit. Lack of clear Conditions leaves the “when” and “where” of institutional 
statements uncertain, so that the default value is “always” and “everywhere” — which may 
escalate control costs. But it is the two remaining components of the syntax which more 
affect the cogency of statements. Without Or-else clauses, the default condition is that no 
consequence will be enforced if the player disregards the prescription related to the position 
she holds. Within IGT, those statements that have the ADIC form merely assert a “norm”, to 
which the players adhere when their personal beliefs make them doing so. If the Deontic 
element is missing, too, there is no modal operator connecting the position to the aim as a 
permitted, obligated, or forbidden choice. This weakens the capacities associated to the 
position because it negates them a normative foundation. Statements with an AIC shape, 
therefore, only provide the player with a position, a purpose, and a context — a broad 
“strategy” without anybody granting or defending it in case of controversy.  
The IGT syntax thus provides a promising toolbox for refining Hp1 in the prospect of 
its empirical testing. It refocuses the research — from the players and the unfolding of the 
process, to the rules that establish their capacities to ask for information and pass judgments, 
and matching obligations to provide information and comply. These rules correspond to well-
known “procedural tools” (Howlett 2000) — judicial review, impact assessment, auditing, 
freedom of information, notice-and-comment — each contributing to shape a special 
accountability vector — legal, expert, and public. 
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.1. The legal vector 
As integral part of the rule of law, regardless of legal tradition, courts have since long 
been given the right to decide on the acceptability of the bureaucracy’s actions, and to check 
whether they do not exceed the mandate or otherwise represent an abuse of rulemaking 
power (Tate 1990). Their right is exerted through the instrument of administrative judicial 
review, which usually also recognizes courts the power of overriding faulty decisions. The 
modes however change. It can be entitled to courts before or after a decision has been 
enacted, and within the adjudication of an actual controversy; or in the abstract. Moreover, 
this right may be exerted by any court, or entitled to specialized courts alone, and apply to 
any decisions of any administrative body or allow exceptions instead. The courts may or may 
not refuse a ruling, the initiation of which may be automatic or follow from individual 
referrals. The cogency of judgements may also span from merely advisory opinions to binding 
invalidation of parts or whole decisions (Kitchin 1990). Finally, courts may focus their review 
on possible violations of basic individual rights, or on the breach of administrative principles 
— among which lawfulness, proportionality, fairness, and reasonableness (Shapiro 1988). The 
contents of these principles however change depending on the shape given to the two 
further vectors: thus, for instance, fairness means that procedures have been followed, but 
procedures may or may not include accountability to the publics and to the experts. 
Consistently with Hp.1, we may expect the legal vector to contribute to policy effectiveness 
when the judicial review is run ex-ante and activated by actual individual concerns; yet we 
cannot assume that it alone secures good policy results. 
.2. The expert vector 
Experts provide an evidence-based appraisal of the contents of administrative action. 
In the accountability relationship, they are often considered as monitors establishing the 
credibility and reliability of policy information of interest to the principals when the 
connection between the trustee’s decision and policy values is remote or complex (Flint 1988, 
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Lupia & McCubbins 1994). Accountability through experts, however, entails accountability to 
experts when monitors appraise the connection between policy values and the contents of 
administrative decision. As the connection is different for decisions about regulation and 
taxation — that impose private costs — and about expenditures — that decide of public costs 
instead — , the procedure for accountability changes accordingly. 
Impact assessment is concerned with the capacity of regulation or taxation to promote 
economic and social welfare efficiently and effectively (Kirkpatrick and Parker 2004). It 
consists in a cost-benefit assessment that can fully question the opportunity, adequacy, and 
completeness of an intervention on the basis of evidence — or only some aspects of it. It may 
be run by administrative offices within the executive, or within accounting authorities. The 
assessment may have a broad or narrow breath as for the time horizon — short- or long-term 
— and for the kinds of effects considered — only economic, or also environmental, social, and 
distributive, with or without attention to special deserving groups. The assessment may pass 
through public consultations of the affected interests, or be run as desk-work on the basis of 
estimates, baseline assumptions, and econometric models (Starnová 2010, Fritsch et al. 2013). 
It may apply to any bureaucracy, or to those alone with a given mandate; and to any proposed 
or actual tool-change, or to major changes only. Impact assessments often constitute a 
requisite for a decision to pass; at the same time, are costly when properly run. Little surprise 
that they have been portrayed as opportunities to award resourceful interests with rents as 
well as to expose rents and capture — depending on whether they are handled as perfunctory 
authorizations or not (Radaelli 2010).  
Auditing focuses on the effectiveness in the use of public monies instead. As such, it 
has been the key driver of much of budgeting and administrative reforms since the 1980s, as 
well as the ground for many of the considerations about agency accountability and its failures. 
The audit either discharges individuals of the use of public funding or assesses the merit, 
worth or value of public expenditure — either of all, or of those alone related to programs 
and projects. Although conceptually requiring independent auditors, it may also be 
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performed by offices within economic ministries (Furubo 2011). It conventionally applies at 
the operational level — in itinere, to monitor crucial variables; ex post, to verify the congruence 
of expenditure to expectations — although it can be also run with a more strategic aim and 
cover ex ante justifications of budgeting requests for policy improvement (Harmon 1995). It 
may narrow on detailed sub-program appropriations or widen to grasp the effect of program 
allocations, and assess them as compliance to expenditure procedures or in relation to 
outputs and outcomes (Lonsdale 2007). Poor performance may either lead to more funding 
or to expenditure termination, depending on the legitimacy of the program’s aims; more 
often, it may be followed by more in-depth auditing activities, and by penalties for those in 
charge of the expenditures — which justify tricks and games and trigger escalations in the 
costs of control, goal displacement, and the like. 
The expert vector appears as the more controversial contribution to the policy-
effectiveness of accountability. Its procedures indeed have the power of ossifying behavior 
and generate perverse effects. Still, Hp1 allows to maintain that they can serve effectiveness, 
too, when they embody the legitimate concerns of affected publics and unveil risks and 
special distributional effects; when run as a strategic activity to justify cost allocation before 
than their management (Mayne 2007); and when their results are accessible to the public. 
.3. The public vector 
Accountability to the wide public is the vector that has attracted the most of the 
recent scholars’ attention, because of its connection to the promises of open and transparent 
government (e.g. Fung et al. 2013, Heald 2006).  
The most diffused procedural instrument is the freedom of information. Recognized as 
a fundamental right by the United Nation’s since Resolution 59(1), it has been differently 
embodied in regional and national standards — and often disregarded — until the recent 
wave of diffusion. Unsurprisingly, current portraits reveal meaningful variations across 
contexts (Mendel 2008). The right may be endowed to any concerned individuals, or to 
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citizens or residents, or to those citizens who can prove that the document directly affects 
some legitimate interest of theirs, or to recognized organizations alone representing their 
interest as in neo-corporative arrangements. It may follow from an obligation to publish any 
document, or to fulfill a request to which a fee may or may not be applied. Exceptions may or 
may not be allowed to special bodies or documents on the basis of sensitivity — as may be 
the case for military, judicial, diplomatic, commercial secrecy, or the individual right to privacy. 
Thus, a body can deny access: and negation may or may not have to be stated in a written note 
explaining the refusal, while the refusal may or may not give a right to appeal — to attorney 
general, courts, ombudsman, commissioner, head of office, or any special authority in charge 
of championing the right of access. The freedom of information may be a weak instrument 
indeed for securing the policy-makers’ accountability to the general public; yet, it entitles 
them with the right to seek relevant policy information from the trustees as well as from 
experts and courts. 
The instrument more closely associated to the trustee’s accountability is the notice-
and-comment rulemaking (Bingham et al. 2005; McCubbins et al. 1987, 1999). The procedure 
enforces the right of the general public to know the content of any, or major, change in 
current policies, and to address public comments to the issuing administrative body — who 
also has the obligation to answer. Comments may therefore either lead to changes in the 
draft, or be dismissed — and the latter option usually requires that reasons are provided. 
Discontented publics may be given no appeal, but can always lobby the political principal. The 
major expected effect is an improvement in the consistency of administrative action so as to 
prevent criticisms and resistances. 
 
When the IGT is applied, the variation in procedure becomes a variation in syntax — as 
summarized in Table 1 below. 
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4. Considerations, and future directions 
The IAD framework advances a promising understanding of accountability as a different angle 
on the puzzling relationship between policy effectiveness and governance. It suggests that 
key players of the policymaking are those with the knowledge for setting the taxation, 
expenditure, and regulation tools that shapes the performance of the delivery system. It 
defines the causal power of accountability in those enforced instructions that compel the key 
players to show how their decisions take special policy values into account — and, before, to 
treat these values as their own. Moreover, its focus on designs highlights how accountability 
can embody two different understandings of democracy.  
Indeed, if the political system is the authoritative allocation of values for a society 
through the policies it delivers, accountability reveals where the relative weight of these 
values is decided when they imply a trade-off. A first view maintains that proper weighting is 
made by the citizens as voters, who endow their deputies with policymaking powers and a 
mandate which bureaucracies have to abide by. The alternative view considers that neither 
election can establish the value weighting for each policy in full details, nor the citizens as 
affected interests usually accept the electoral weighting passively: rather, they keep trying to 
foster their concern through pressures on the whole of the policymaking process. The former 
view entails that accountability sticks the policymakers to the electoral mandate, and secures 
the political command on bureaucracies along a straight line of delegation. In the latter, 
accountability is meant for keeping pressures transparent and the decisions on instruments 
open to the reasons and checks of the publics beyond the broad indications from the political 
majority. 
Both views can be given normative grounds as much as reasons for skepticism. Yet 
again, the IAD warns against beliefs in “optimal designs” as much as against disbeliefs — and 
makes a bold case instead for empirical adjudication on the basis of the observed productivity 
of institutions. “Without the capacity to undertake systematic, comparative institutional 
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assessments, recommendations of reform may be based on naïve ideas about which kinds of 
institutions are ‘good’ or ‘bad’, and not on an analysis of performance” (Ostrom, 2005:29).  
The IGT syntax offers the suitable complement for operationalizing the two ideas: it 
provides a comprehensive and reasoned list of the elements that should be found in a context 
for accountability rules to be effective — and expectations of the effect from missing 
components. It makes comparison possible across contexts and time. It allows both the 
exploration of institutional diversity and the verification of hypotheses about the generative 
power of the different shapes accountability designs.  
The IAD and the IGT together therefore promise a fruitful support to the research 
agenda on the policy effectiveness of accountability. The generative capacity of accountability 
procedures may be tested against a variety of outcomes — from regulatory effectiveness to 
corruption, financial and environmental sustainability, trust in government. At the same time, 
however, they open a further challenge. As Ostrom underlines, rules have configurational 
effects, as “…one small part of a rule configuration can strongly affect how the other rules 
impact the action situation. Scholars need to study the effects of a full rule configuration 
rather than assume that they can study the impact of one rule at a time — while assuming 
that the other rules are ‘randomly distributed’” (Ostrom 2005:205). The further question 
hence asks which technique can better suit the configurational analysis of institutional 
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